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Assignment markets with the same core
Abstract: In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of
matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions
on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core.
We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice
with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a
characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the
join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given.
Keywords: assignment game, core, semilattice
JEL: C71
Resumen: En el contexto de los juegos de asignacio´n bilaterales, estudiamos el
conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignacio´n con el mismo nu´cleo. Se
proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos
de asignacio´n asociados tienen el mismo nu´cleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de
matrices que dan lugar al mismo nu´cleo forman un semirret´ıculo con un nu´mero
finito de elementos minimales y un u´nico ma´ximo. Se da una caracterizacio´n de estos
elementos minimales. Tambie´n se proporciona una condicio´n suficiente para obtener
un ret´ıculo.
1 Introduction
Since Shapley and Shubik (1972) the bilateral assignment game has been analyzed
from different points of view, with special emphasis placed on the analysis of the core.
In a bilateral assignment game there is a finite set of buyers, each one demanding
one unit of an indivisible good, and a finite set of sellers, each one supplying one
unit of the good. From the valuations of the buyers and the reservation prices of the
sellers, a non-negative matrix can be obtained that represents the joint profit that
each buyer-seller pair can achieve. This market situation can be represented by a
game in coalitional form where the worth of each coalition is the profit that it can
obtain from an optimal matching between buyers and sellers in the corresponding
submarket. Those allocations of the total profit where each coalition receives at least
its worth constitute the core of the game.
It is known that the core of an assignment game is a non-empty convex and
compact polyhedral endowed with a lattice structure which implies the existence of
two opposite extreme allocations, one of them optimal for the buyers and the other
optimal for the sellers. An analysis of the extreme core allocations of the assignment
game is carried out by Balinski and Gale (1987). They show how to check, by means
of the connectedness of a graph, whether a core allocation is an extreme point. Later,
Hamers et al. (2002), Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2003) and Izquierdo et al. (2007) describe
the set of vertices by means of three different procedures, each of them involving the
definition of a payoff vector for each possible ordering on the player set.
The aim of this paper is to study the matrices that define assignment markets
with the same core. The importance of this question lies in the fact that all the
markets defined by these matrices have the same extreme core allocations and also
the same nucleolus. The nucleolus is a single-valued solution for games in coalitional
form that was introduced by Schmeidler (1969) and, for games with a non-empty
core, it occupies a central position in the core. It is defined as the unique payoff that
lexicographically minimizes the vector of nonincreasingly-ordered excesses. Solymosi
and Raghavan (1994) give an algorithm to compute the nucleolus of an assignment
game. It is known from Nu´n˜ez (2004) that all assignment games with the same core
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also have the same nucleolus. Thus, once identified the class of matrices leading to
markets with the same core, it is sufficient to compute the nucleolus of one of these
markets. The same applies to the set of extreme core allocations.
In addition, when looking for assignment matrices leading to the same core we
identify which valuations of the agents are essential to determine the core. It turns
out that, in most markets, some agents can lower some of their valuations without
modifying the core of the market. As a consequence, these agents (assume they are
buyers) will not benefit, in the sense of being able to achieve a more favorable core
allocation, from pretending to have lower valuations for some specific objects.
To characterize the set of assignment matrices defining markets with the same
core, we first develop a necessary and sufficient condition to determine if two given
square matrices lead to the same core. This condition states that by removing an
arbitrarily given mixed pair formed by a buyer and a seller the optimal profit for
both submarkets thus obtained must coincide. As a consequence, it turns out that
the optimal profit of both entire markets also coincide. We then show that the set
of matrices defining markets with the same core is a join-semilattice with respect to
the usual order on the set of matrices, with one maximum element and finitely many
minimal elements.
The above result is obtained in Section 4, after providing in Section 3 the afore-
mentioned useful characterization to recognize whether two matrices lead to the same
core. In Section 5 a sufficient condition on the assignment matrix is given so that its
related join-semilattice is in fact a lattice. A characterization of the minimal elements
of the join-semilattice is given in Section 6.
2 The assignment game: notations and prelimi-
naries
A two-sided assignment market (M,M ′, A) is defined by a finite set of buyers M, a
finite set of sellersM ′, and a nonnegative matrix A = (aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ . The number aij
represents the profit obtained by the mixed-pair (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′ if they trade. Let
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us assume there are |M | = m buyers and |M ′| = m′ sellers, and n = m +m′ is the
cardinality of N =M ∪M ′. If m = m′, the assignment market is said to be square.
A matching µ ⊆ M ×M ′ between M and M ′ is a bijection from M0 ⊆ M to
M ′0 ⊆ M ′, such that |M0| = |M ′0| = min {|M | , |M ′|} . We write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as
j = µ (i) or i = µ−1 (j) . The set of all matchings is denoted by M (M,M ′) .
A matching µ ∈ M (M,M ′) is optimal for the assignment market (M,M ′, A) if
for all µ′ ∈ M (M,M ′) we have ∑(i,j)∈µ aij ≥ ∑(i,j)∈µ′ aij, and we denote the set of
optimal matchings by M∗A (M,M ′) .
Given S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′, we denote by M (S, T ) and M∗A (S, T ) the set of
matchings and optimal matchings of the submarket
(
S, T,A|S×T
)
.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote a finite set of players, and 2N the set of all possible
coalitions or subsets of N. A cooperative game in coalitional form is a pair (N, v),
where v : 2N −→ R, with v(∅) = 0, is the characteristic function which assigns to
each coalition the worth it can attain.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) associate to any assignment market a cooperative game
in coalitional form, with player set N and characteristic function wA defined by A in
the following way: for S ⊆M and T ⊆M ′, wA (S ∪ T ) = max
{∑
(i,j)∈µ aij | µ ∈M (S, T )
}
.
The core of the assignment game is always non-empty, and it is enough to impose
coalitional rationality for one-player coalitions and mixed-pair coalitions:
Core (wA) =
(u, v) ∈ RM+ × RM ′+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M ui +
∑
j∈M ′ vj = wA (N) ,
ui + vj ≥ aij, for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′
 . (1)
It follows from (1) that those pairs (i, j) ∈ M × M ′ that are assigned by any
optimal matching share exactly the worth aij of their mixed-pair coalition, and unas-
signed players get zero.
By adding dummy players, that is, null rows or columns in the assignment matrix,
we can assume from now on and without loss of generality that the number of sellers
equals the number of buyers, and in this way the assignment matrix is square. It is
easy to see that these dummy players get zero at any core allocation.
An assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA) is buyer-seller exact (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 2002)
if for any (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′ there is a point (u, v) in its core such that ui + vj = aij.
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Notice that if an assignment game is buyer-seller exact then no entry in the matrix
can be raised without modifying the core. It is shown that for each assignment game
(M ∪M ′, wA) there exists a unique buyer-seller exact assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA)
such that Core (wA) = Core (wA) . This matrix A is said to be the buyer-seller exact
representative of A and it is defined by:
aij = min
(u,v)∈Core(wA)
ui + vj. (2)
Then, an assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA) is buyer-seller exact if and only if A = A,
and as a consequence A = A.
Notice that if (i, j) ∈ µ for some µ ∈ M∗A (M,M ′) we get aij = aij. Then it is
obvious that M∗A (M,M ′) ⊆M∗A (M,M ′) .
When A is square and µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) , the matrix entries of A can be expressed,
for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′, either by
aij = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j − wA(N) + wA(N \ {µ(i), µ−1(j)}), (3)
or
aij = max {aij, a˜ij} , (4)
where
a˜ij = max
{
aiµ(k1) + ak1µ(k2) + . . .+ akrj − ak1µ(k1) − . . .− akrµ(kr)
}
, (5)
with k1, k2, . . . , kr ∈ M \ {i, µ−1(j)} and all different. Notice that (3) makes use of
the characteristic function, while (4) only makes use of the matrix entries.
Buyer-seller exact assignment games are also characterized (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels,
2002) by a property of the assignment matrix, namely doubly dominant diagonal. Fol-
lowing Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), given a square assignment market (M,M ′, A),
and µ ∈ M∗A (M,M ′) an optimal matching, the market (M,M ′, A) is said to have a
doubly dominant diagonal with respect to µ if for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ and k ∈M,
aij + akµ(k) ≥ aiµ(k) + akj. (6)
This means that what any pair (i, j) ∈M×M ′ gets together with an optimal assigned
pair (k, µ (k)) cannot be improved by rearranging the agents. This is only restrictive
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if k ∈M \{i, µ−1(j)} . Since the property of being buyer-seller exact does not depend
on the optimal matching µ, but only on the core, if (M,M ′, A) has a doubly dominant
diagonal with respect some µ, it also has with respect any other µ′ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) .
3 Assignment matrices leading to markets with
the same core
It is a fact that different assignment markets may have the same core. For instance,
we assert that matrices A and B below have the same core, although they do not
have any optimal matching in common. Let it be M = {1, 2, 3},M ′ = {1′, 2′, 3′},
A =

4 5 5
4 5 1
4 1 5
 and B =

0 5 5
4 0 5
4 5 0
 ,
and notice that if we remove from the market a mixed pair (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′, both
resulting submarkets get the same optimal profit. Take for instance the mixed pair
(1, 1′) ∈ M ×M ′ and notice that wA(N \ {1, 1′}) = wB(N \ {1, 1′}) = 10, although
their optimal matchings differ.
The coincidence of the optimal profit of these submarkets, where an arbitrarily
given mixed pair has been removed, is the criterion to check the core coincidence
that will be stated in Theorem 3.1. To this end, the next lemma provides a new and
alternative description of the core of a square assignment game.
Lemma 3.1. Let (M,M ′, A) be a square assignment market. Then,
Core (wA) =
(u, v) ∈ R
M
+ × RM
′
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M ui +
∑
j∈M ′ vj = wA (N) ,
ui + vj ≤ wA(N)− wA(N \ {i, j}),
for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′
 . (7)
Proof. Given (M,M ′, A) an assignment market, recall that the core of the assignment
game has been described in (1). We denote by C the right-hand side of (7) and claim
that Core (wA) equals C.
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The inclusion of the core in C is straightforward because by coalitional rationality
any allocation (u, v) ∈ Core (wA) satisfies, for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′∑
i′∈M\{i}
ui′ +
∑
j′∈M ′\{j}
vj′ ≥ wA(N \ {i, j}),
and by efficiency we obtain ui + vj ≤ wA(N)− wA(N \ {i, j}).
To prove the converse inclusion, take (u, v) ∈ C, and notice that once fixed µ ∈
M∗A (M,M ′) , we have ui + vj ≤ wA(N) − wA(N \ {i, j}) = aij for (i, j) ∈ µ, that,
together with
∑
i∈M ui +
∑
j∈M ′ vj = wA (N) , leads to ui + vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ.
Moreover for any (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ consider their assigned players2 by any optimal
matching µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) . We have, for any (u, v) ∈ C,
uµ−1(j) + vµ(i) ≤ wA(N)− wA(N \ {µ−1(j), µ(i)}),
and taking into account the previous remark we obtain:
aµ−1(j)j − vj + aiµ(i) − ui ≤ wA(N)− wA(N \ {µ−1(j), µ(i)}).
Thus,
ui + vj ≥ aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j − wA(N) + wA(N \ {µ−1(j), µ(i)}) ≥ aij,
where the last inequality comes from the superadditivity of the game and the fact
that wA(N)− aiµ(i) − aµ−1(j)j = wA(N \ {i, j, µ(i), µ−1(j)}).
The above description of the core in (7), as it is also the case of description (1), is
given by the efficiency condition and one inequality constraint associated with each
(i, j) ∈M ×M ′. In contrast with description (1) the inequalities in (7) are reversed.
However, what is more remarkable of (7) is that each of these constraints is tight at
some core allocation (see Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 2002), which is not necessarily the case
in the classical description of the core.
With this expression for the core, it is quite straightforward to realize that the
coincidence of the core of two assignment markets is characterized by the coincidence
of the worth, in both games, of the coalitions of type N \ {i, j}, for each (i, j) ∈
M ×M ′.
2Notice that there are no agents unassigned because the market is square.
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Theorem 3.1. Let (M,M ′, A) and (M,M ′, B) be two square assignment markets.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
1. Core (wA) = Core (wB) .
2. wA(N \ {i, j}) = wB(N \ {i, j}), for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′.
Proof. To prove 1. ⇒ 2., notice first that from Core (wA) = Core (wB) we trivially
have wA(N) = wB(N).
Consider nowA, the buyer-seller representative of matrixA. Take µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′)
and recall that also µ ∈M∗
A
(M,M ′) . For any i ∈M we have aiµ(i) = aiµ(i).Moreover,
recall that A = A.
Then, we have that for any mixed pair (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ :
aij = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j − wA(N) + wA(N \ {µ(i), µ−1(j)}), and
aij = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j − wA(N) + wA(N \ {µ(i), µ−1(j)}.
As a consequence we obtain wA(N \ {µ(i), µ−1(j)}) = wA(N \ {µ(i), µ−1(j)}), for
any (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′. Notice that since µ is a bijection and i and j are arbitrary, we
have wA(N \ {i, j}) = wA(N \ {i, j}) for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′.
Now, since Core (wA) = Core (wB) , from (2) we know that A = B, and then for
any (i, j) ∈M ×M ′, we have wA(N \ {i, j}) = wA(N \ {i, j}) = wB(N \ {i, j}).
As for the converse implication, notice first that by the non-emptiness of the core,
any element (u, v) ∈ Core (wA) satisfies
wA(N \ {i, j}) ≤
∑
i′∈M\{i}
ui′ +
∑
j′∈M ′\{j}
vj′ for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′.
By addition of these inequalities for all (i, j) ∈ µ, where µ ∈ M (M,M ′) is an
arbitrary matching, we have∑
(i,j)∈µ
wA(N \ {i, j}) ≤ (m− 1)wA(N),
that holds with equality for any optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A (M,M ′) , since then
wA(N \ {i, j}) + aij = wA(N), for any (i, j) ∈ µ. Thus,
max
µ∈M(M,M ′)
∑
(i,j)∈µ
wA(N \ {i, j}) = (m− 1)wA(N).
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Therefore, under statement 2, we have wA(N) = wB(N). The remainder of the
proof is a direct application of Lemma 3.1.
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that for assignment games
with two agents on each side, different matrices lead to different cores.
Corollary 3.1. Let (M,M ′, A) and (M,M ′, B) be two assignment markets, with
|M | = |M ′| = 2. Then, Core (wA) = Core (wB) if and only if A = B.
Let us remark that in the proof of the above Theorem 3.1 we have seen that
the coincidence of the worth of coalitions (N \ {i, j}) for (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′, that is,
wA(N \ {i, j}) = wB(N \ {i, j}), implies the coincidence of the worth of the grand
coalition, wA(N) = wB(N). Also, under the same conditions and for each k ∈ N, the
coincidence of the worths of coalition N \ {k} is obtained. If, for instance, k ∈ M,
then we have
wA(N \ {k}) = max
j∈M ′
wA(N \ {k, j}) = max
j∈M ′
wB(N \ {k, j}) = wB(N \ {k}).
4 The semilattice structure of the set of matrices
leading to the same core
In this section we analyze the structure of the class of square matrices that give rise
to the same core in the associated assignment game.
DefineM+m as the set of all matrices of m rows and m columns with non-negative
entries. Notice that M+m is a lattice with the usual ordering ≤, that is, given A,B ∈
M+m, A ≤ B if and only if aij ≤ bij for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Moreover,
A < B if and only if A ≤ B and A 6= B. If A,B ∈M+m, then the interval [A,B] is the
set of all matrices in between A and B, that is [A,B] = {C ∈M+m | A ≤ C ≤ B} .
Now, for each matrix A ∈M+m, define
〈A〉 = {B ∈M+m | Core(wB) = Core(wA)} .
This is the equivalence class of all matrices such that the associated assignment game
has the same core. By definition, 〈A〉 contains the buyer-seller exact representative
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A. Notice that if A1 ≤ B ≤ A2 with A1, A2 ∈ 〈A〉, then B ∈ 〈A〉, as can be seen from
Theorem 3.1.
The next theorem provides the structure of the set of all matrices leading to the
same core. It turns out that it is a finite union of lattices (intervals) with the same
maximum.
Theorem 4.1. For any square assignment market (M,M ′, A), with matrix A ∈M+m,
there exists a finite number of matrices A1, A2, . . . , Ap, in M
+
m, such that
〈A〉 =
p⋃
q=1
[
Aq, A
]
,
where A is the buyer-seller exact representative of A.
Proof. Given a matrix A ∈ M+m, we analyze which entries can be lowered from
A = (aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ without modifying the core of the assignment game.
To this end, for each set K of pairs in M ×M ′, we define matrix AK , by
aKij =
 0 if (i, j) ∈ K,aij if (i, j) /∈ K.
Next, consider the set Λ (A) =
{
K ⊆M ×M ′ | Core(w
A
K ) = Core(wA)
}
, and no-
tice that ∅ ∈ Λ (A) . Therefore, Λ (A) is a non-empty finite set and as a consequence
the set ΛM (A) of maximal elements of (Λ (A) ,⊆) is a non-empty finite set: ΛM (A) =
{K1, K2, . . . , Kp} . At this point we define Aq = AKq for q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, the ma-
trices corresponding to these maximal elements. The inclusion
p⋃
q=1
[
Aq, A
] ⊆ 〈A〉 is
immediate.
To prove the converse inclusion, let us take B ∈ 〈A〉. We know that B ≤ B = A,
and now define KB =
{
(i, j) ∈M ×M ′ | bij < bij = aij
}
.
If KB = ∅, then B = B = A and we are done. In other case, we have AKB ≤ B ≤
A and we claim that Core(w
A
KB ) = Core(wA).
Since B ∈ 〈A〉, by Theorem 3.1 we have that
wB(N \ {i∗, j∗}) = wA(N \ {i∗, j∗}), for any (i∗, j∗) ∈M ×M ′. (8)
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Then, for any (i∗, j∗) ∈ M ×M ′ we assert that no (i, j) ∈ KB belongs to any opti-
mal matching of the submarket
(
M \ {i∗},M ′ \ {j∗}, B|M\{i∗}×M ′\{j∗}
)
. Otherwise, if
there exist µ ∈M∗B (M \ {i∗},M ′ \ {j∗}) and (i, j) ∈ KB ∩ µ, then we will have
wB(N \ {i∗, j∗}) =
∑
(i′,j′)∈µ
bi′j′ <
∑
(i′,j′)∈µ
ai′j′ ≤ wA(N \ {i∗, j∗}),
in contradiction with (8).
As a consequence, we have w
A
KB (N \ {i∗, j∗}) = wA(N \ {i∗, j∗}), and by Theo-
rem 3.1 we prove our claim that Core(w
A
KB ) = Core(wA). To sum up, B ∈
[
A
KB
, A
]
with A
KB ∈ 〈A〉.
If KB ∈ ΛM (A) we are done. Otherwise, there exists K ∈ Λ (A) , maximal with
KB ⊆ K, and thus, from AK ≤ AKB ≤ B ≤ A, we get B ∈
[
A
K
, A
]
.
Theorem 4.1 shows that (〈A〉,≤) is a join-semilattice with a finite number of
minimal elements, and one maximal element, its maximum, A. This maximum can
be computed by means of (3).
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1 suggest a procedure to find all the minimal matrices
in (〈A〉,≤) under the assumption that the given matrix A is buyer-seller exact. One
must identify those matrix entries that are essential to preserve the worth of coalitions
N \{i, j} for all (i, j) ∈M×M ′. Those entries cannot be lowered, nor can decrease the
null entries. But it may happen that a submarket
(
M \ {i},M ′ \ {j}, A|M\{i}×M ′\{j}
)
have several optimal matchings and then we have different choices. In this way we
will obtain the different minimal elements of 〈A〉. For instance, consider the following
example.
Example 4.1. Let A be a buyer-seller exact matrix
A =

5 6 5
2 3 2
0 1 1

with M = {1, 2, 3}, and M ′ = {1′, 2′, 3′}. The elements that are zero or strictly
necessary to preserve wA(N \ {i, j}) for (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ are in boldface. Notice that,
since in any of those submarkets at least one optimal matching has to be preserved,
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we cannot lower simultaneously entries a13 and a23. Thus, in this case the minimal
matrices in 〈A〉 are:
A1 =

5 6 0
2 3 2
0 0 1
 and A2 =

5 6 5
2 3 0
0 0 1
 .
This example illustrates that 〈A〉 is not in general a lattice. The next section
provides a condition that is sufficient to ensure that 〈A〉 is a lattice.
5 A sufficient condition to obtain a lattice
In this section we look for conditions on a matrix A that guarantee that 〈A〉 has only
one minimal element. In this case the join-semilattice is in fact a lattice.
To this end we focus on assignment matrices with a unique optimal matching and
we determine the unique minimal matrix in a constructive way. This is the generic
case, since small perturbations can destroy the multiplicity of optimal matchings.
Theorem 5.1. Let it be (M,M ′, A) a square assignment market. If A ∈M+m has a
unique optimal matching, then 〈A〉 has a unique minimal element.
Proof. Making use of Theorem 6 in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2008), it can be deduced that
if A has a unique optimal matching, its buyer-seller exact representative A has also
a unique optimal matching, the same one. We also have 〈A〉 = 〈A〉, and therefore
we can assume without loss of generality that matrix A is buyer-seller exact, that is
A = A. Let us identify a minimal element of 〈A〉 and prove its uniqueness.
Let µ be the unique optimal matching of A and consider the following set of pairs
of agents:
I =
(i, j) ∈M ×M ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣ there exists k ∈M \ {i, µ
−1 (j)}
with aij + akµ(k) = aiµ(k) + akj
 .
We claim that matrix B defined by
bij =
 0 if (i, j) ∈ I,aij if (i, j) /∈ I.
13
is the unique minimal element in 〈A〉.
We first check that B ∈ 〈A〉 by proving that B = A. Notice now that I does
not include any assigned pair by µ, since otherwise there would be another optimal
matching for (M,M ′, A). Then, bij = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ and, as a consequence,
A and B have the same optimal matching µ, and the same optimal profit for the
grand coalition. Since B ≤ A, and wA(N) = wB(N), we know that Core (wA) ⊆
Core (wB) = Core (wB) . Moreover, since A is buyer-seller exact, for any (i, j) ∈
M ×M ′ there is a point (u, v) ∈ Core (wA) such that ui + vj = aij. Then aij ≥ bij,
for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ and therefore B ≤ A.
We have to prove that also B ≥ A. For all (i, j) /∈ I we obtain trivially that
aij = bij ≤ bij. If I = ∅, we are done. Otherwise we take any (i, j) ∈ I and we claim
that there exist k1, k2, ..., kp ∈M \ {i, µ−1 (j)} for some p ≥ 1, and all different such
that
aij + ak1µ(k1) + ak2µ(k2) + ...+ akpµ(kp) = aiµ(k1) + ak1µ(k2) + ak2µ(k3) + ...+ akpj, (9)
where (i, µ (k1)) , (k1, µ (k2)) , (k2, µ (k3)) , ..., (kp, j) do not belong to I.
If we prove the claim we are done, because aiµ(k1) = biµ(k1), ak1µ(k2) = bk1µ(k2), . . . , akpj =
bkpj, and then
aij = biµ(k1) + bk1µ(k2) + . . .+ bkpj − bk1µ(k1) − bk2µ(k2) − . . .− bkpµ(kp) ≤ bij,
by (4).
To prove the claim in (9), notice first that since (i, j) ∈ I, there exists k ∈
M \ {i, µ−1 (j)} such that
aij + akµ(k) = aiµ(k) + akj. (10)
If (i, µ (k)) and (k, j) do not belong to I we are done. If this is not the case, assume
without loss of generality that (i, µ (k)) ∈ I. Then
aiµ(k) + aekµ(ek) = aiµ(ek) + aekµ(k), (11)
for some k˜ ∈M \ {i, k}.
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By addition of (10) and (11), we get
aij + aekµ(ek) + akµ(k) = aiµ(ek) + aekµ(k) + akj. (12)
Let us write k1 = k˜ and k2 = k, and see that k1, k2 ∈ M \ {i, µ−1 (j)} and are
different. If not, the only possibility is that µ (k1) = j, but in that case (12) reduces
to
ak1µ(k1) + ak2µ(k2) = ak1µ(k2) + ak2µ(k1),
in contradiction with the uniqueness of the optimal matching of (M,M ′, A).
Assume by iteration that we have reached a step such that:
aij + ak1µ(k1) + ak2µ(k2) + ...+ akqµ(kq) = aiµ(k1) + ak1µ(k2) + ak2µ(k3) + ...+ akqj, (13)
for some q ≥ 1 and k1, k2, ..., kq ∈M \ {i, µ−1 (j)} all different.
Then, if all pairs (i, µ (k1)) , (k1, µ (k2)) , (k2, µ (k3)) , ..., (kq, j) do not belong to I
we are done. If this is not the case, write i = k0 and kq+1 = µ
−1 (j) and assume that
for some l ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , q + 1} we have (kl, µ (kl+1)) ∈ I. Then,
aklµ(kl+1) + ak′µ(k′) = aklµ(k′) + ak′µ(kl+1), (14)
for some k′ ∈M \ {kl, kl+1}.
Notice that there is a point (u, v) ∈ Core (wA) such that ui + vj = aij, since
(M ∪M ′, wA) is a buyer-seller exact game, and also uks + vµ(ks) = aksµ(ks) for s ∈
{1, 2, . . . , q}, since µ is an optimal matching for A. Thus (13) is equivalent to
uk0 + vµ(kq+1) +
q∑
s=1
(
uks + vµ(ks)
)
=
q∑
s=0
aksµ(ks+1),
and since (u, v) belongs to Core (wA) we obtain that
uks + vµ(ks+1) = aksµ(ks+1) for s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q}. (15)
In particular, ukl + vµ(kl+1) = aklµ(kl+1), that together with (14) gives
ukl + vµ(k′) = aklµ(k′)
uk′ + vµ(kl+1) = ak′µ(kl+1).
(16)
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If k′ = kt for some t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , q + 1} (let us assume that t < l, since in the case
that t > l + 1, the argument is similar), then (15) and (16) lead to
aktµ(kl+1) +
l∑
s=t+1
aksµ(ks) = ukt + vµ(kl+1) +
l∑
s=t+1
(uks + vµ(ks)) =
l∑
s=t
aksµ(ks+1). (17)
Then, adding up (14) and (17), and simplifying, we obtain
l∑
s=t
aksµ(ks) =
l−1∑
s=t
aksµ(ks+1) + aklµ(kt).
This equality gives rise to a different optimal matching, in contradiction with the
assumption.
Thus, we can guarantee k′ /∈ {i, k1, k2, ..., kq, µ−1 (j)} , and by addition of (13) and
(14) we obtain an equality like (13) with one more term on each side, and all agents
involved different. Since the market is finite, we can continue until we reach a step
with an equality like in (13) with (kl, µ (kl+1)) /∈ I for all l ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , q}, and this
proves our claim.
Now we have to prove that B is minimal in 〈A〉 and unique with this minimality
property, and therefore [B,A] = 〈A〉. Assume on the contrary that there is another
matrix C ∈ 〈A〉 and minimal, and such that ci′j′ < ai′j′ for some (i′, j′) /∈ I. In this
case all matrices in [C,A] also belong to 〈A〉. Because (i′, j′) /∈ I, we have that for all
k ∈M \ {i′, µ−1 (j′)}, ai′j′ + akµ(k) > ai′µ(k) + akj′ . Then, let ε > 0 be such that
ai′j′ − ε > ai′µ(k) + akj′ − akµ(k)
for all k ∈M \ {i′, µ−1 (j′)}, and also ai′j′ − ε > ci′j′ . Now define matrix Ĉ as
ĉij =
 ai′j′ − ε if (i, j) = (i′, j′),aij otherwise.
Obviously Ĉ ∈ [C,A] ⊆ 〈A〉, Ĉ 6= A and Ĉ is a buyer-seller exact matrix using (6), in
contradiction with the fact that A is the buyer-seller exact representative of 〈A〉.
Notice that in the proof of Theorem 5.1 we show how to find the minimal element
in 〈A〉 for matrices A with a unique optimal matching: first compute its buyer-seller
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representative A, and then find the set I to obtain matrix A
I
, which is the minimal
element.
A natural question following this result is whether the converse statement is true.
That is, if whenever the semilattice is a lattice, we have the uniqueness of the optimal
matching. The answer is negative, as the following example shows.
Example 5.1. The matrix 
3 4 0
4 5 1
0 1 6

has two optimal matchings, but the same argument as in Example 4.1 shows that the
corresponding semilattice has only one minimal element that is
3 4 0
4 5 0
0 0 6
 .
6 A characterization of minimality
In the previous section we have seen how to find the unique minimal matrix in the set
〈A〉 whenever A has a unique optimal matching. In the general case, when multiple
minimal elements may exist, it is necessary to identify which are the entries that must
be modified to find these minimal elements.
The basic idea is that if a matrix B is not minimal in 〈A〉 then some matrix
entries can be lowered to zero without modifying the core. The reason is that the
corresponding core constraint is already implied by other core inequalities. This is
captured by the following definition.
Definition 6.1. Let it be (M,M ′, A) a square assignment market and µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) .
We say (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ is core-redundant with respect to µ if and only if (i, j) /∈ µ
and there exist r ≥ 1 and k1, k2, ..., kr ∈M \ {i, µ−1 (j)} all different such that
0 < aij ≤ aiµ(k1) + ak1µ(k2) + ak2µ(k3) + ...+ akrj −
∑r
l=1 aklµ(kl). (18)
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We denote by RA(µ) the set of all pairs that are core-redundant with respect to
the optimal matching µ.
Notice that if (i, j) ∈ RA(µ), any payoff vector (u, v) ∈ RM+ ×RM ′+ that satisfies the
core constraints related to the matrix entries of the right-hand side of (18) also satisfies
the core constraint related to aij. Notice also that if aij = 0 for some (i, j) ∈M×M ′,
the related core constraint is already guaranteed by the non-negativity of the payoffs.
It could seem that if the core-redundant pairs coincide for all optimal matchings,
we could set their entries to zero, but in Example 4.1, although there are two optimal
matchings, namely µ1 and µ2, and they have the same core-redundant pairs,
RA(µ1) = R
A(µ2) = {(1, 3′), (2, 3′), (3, 2′)},
we cannot lower simultaneously entries a13 and a23.
Now we turn to a lemma that shows that one arbitrary core-redundant pair can
be lowered to zero without modifying the core.
Lemma 6.1. Let it be (M,M ′, A) a square assignment market with A ∈ M+m and
µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) . If (i∗, j∗) ∈ RA(µ), then B ∈M+m defined by
bij =
 0 if (i, j) = (i∗, j∗),aij otherwise ,
satisfies B ∈ 〈A〉.
Proof. First notice that wA(N) = wB(N), because (i
∗, j∗) /∈ µ. Moreover, B ≤ A,
and therefore Core(wA) ⊆ Core(wB). Conversely, let it be (u, v) ∈ Core(wB). For all
(i, j) 6= (i∗, j∗) it holds ui + vj ≥ bij = aij. Since (i∗, j∗) ∈ RA(µ), there exist r ≥ 1
and k1, k2, ..., kr ∈M \ {i∗, µ−1 (j∗)} all different such that
ui∗ + vj∗ = ui∗ + vj∗ +
∑r
l=1(ukl + vµ(kl))−
∑r
l=1 aklµ(kl) ≥
ai∗µ(k1) +
∑r−1
l=1 aklµ(kl+1) + akrj∗ −
∑r
l=1 aklµ(kl) ≥ ai∗j∗ ,
where the first inequality follows from (u, v) ∈ Core(wB) and the last one from
(i∗, j∗) ∈ RA(µ). Then Core(wB) ⊆ Core(wA).
From the above lemma we obtain that if there exists some (i∗, j∗) ∈ RA(µ),
for some µ ∈ M∗A (M,M ′) , matrix A cannot be minimal in 〈A〉, since there exists
B ∈ 〈A〉 with B < A. The converse implication also holds, as the next theorem states.
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Theorem 6.1. Let it be (M,M ′, A) a square assignment market with A ∈M+m. Then
B ∈ 〈A〉 is minimal if and only if RB(µ) = ∅ for all µ ∈M∗B (M,M ′) .
Proof. Assume that B ∈ 〈A〉 is not minimal and RB(µ) = ∅ for all µ ∈M∗B (M,M ′) .
In this case there exists C˜ ∈ 〈A〉 with C˜ < B, and therefore there exists (i∗, j∗) ∈
M × M ′ such that c˜i∗j∗ < bi∗j∗ . Notice that w eC(N) = wB(N) and for any µ ∈
M∗eC (M,M ′) , it also holds µ ∈ M∗B (M,M ′) . As a consequence (i∗, j∗) /∈ µ, for any
µ ∈M∗eC (M,M ′) .
Take then µ ∈ M∗eC (M,M ′) . Since bi∗j∗ > c˜i∗j∗ ≥ 0 and (i∗, j∗) /∈ µ, the
assumption that (i∗, j∗) /∈ RB(µ) implies that for all r ≥ 1 and k1, k2, ..., kr ∈
M \ {i∗, µ−1 (j∗)} all different it holds that
bi∗j∗ > bi∗µ(k1) +
r−1∑
l=1
bklµ(kl+1) + bkrj∗ −
r∑
l=1
bklµ(kl). (19)
Let ε > 0 be such that bi∗j∗ − ε > c˜i∗j∗ and also
bi∗j∗ − ε > bi∗µ(k1) +
r−1∑
l=1
bklµ(kl+1) + bkrj∗ −
r∑
l=1
bklµ(kl),
for all k1, k2, ..., kr ∈M \ {i∗, µ−1 (j∗)} and different.
Now define matrix C ∈M+m by:
cij =
 bij − ε if (i, j) = (i∗, j∗),bij otherwise.
The above considerations, making use of (4), imply that ci∗j∗ = ci∗j∗ . Thus there
exists (u, v) ∈ Core(wC) with ui∗ + vj∗ = ci∗j∗ < bi∗j∗ , a contradiction with the fact
that Core(wC) = Core(wB).
The converse implication is immediate from Lemma 6.1.
By means of the above theorem we can identify when a given matrix A ∈M+m is
minimal in 〈A〉. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 6.1. Let us consider M = {1, 2, 3, 4},M ′ = {1′, 2′, 3′, 4′} and the matrix
A =

10 1 4 0
1 10 1 1
2 0 4 3
1 3 3 4
 ,
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where the only optimal matching µ is placed on the main diagonal.
The reader can check that (1, 2′) ∈ RA(µ), since 1 = a12 < a13 + a34 + a42 − a33 −
a44 = 2, and thus, A is not minimal in 〈A〉.
We can use (3) to compute the buyer-seller exact representative of the class and
apply twice Lemma 6.1 to matrix A or the procedure in Theorem 5.1 to obtain the
minimal element in 〈A〉. Then, all the matrices
10 α 4 β
1 10 1 1
2 γ 4 3
δ 3 3 4

for α ∈ [0, 2], β ∈ [0, 3], γ ∈ [0, 2], δ ∈ [0, 1], define the same market with the same
core, kernel and nucleolus.
In general, there may exist several minimal elements of 〈A〉 below a given matrix
A. We would obtain them by iterated application of Lemma 6.1.
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